Demographic and Economic Consequences of the Post-war Mortality Decline in Developing Countries by Lehmijoki, Ulla & Palokangas, Tapio
Demographic and Economic Consequences of
the Post-war Mortality Decline in Developing
Countries
Ulla Lehmijoki
University of Helsinki
HECER and IZA
Tapio Palokangas
University of Helsinki
HECER and IZA
Discussion Paper No. 642:2010
ISBN 978-952-10-5354-2, ISSN 1459-3696
April 20, 2010
Abstract
Since World War II, mortality has decreased in the developing world.
This paper explores the effects of this mortality fall on economic and
demographic growth by a family-optimization model with endogenous
fertility. Relative wealth yields utility through status for a family.
The main findings are that the increased life expectancy generates
an income stream which promotes fertility, but that the desire for
status hampers fertility and warrants economic growth by preventing
capital-diluting demographic expansion. If status-seeking is strong,
population growth decreases below its original level in the long run.
In the short run, population growth overshoots.
Journal of Economic Literature: O41, J13, J10, O10
Keywords: mortality, population growth, economic growth
Addresses of the Authors: Ulla Lehmijoki, University of Helsinki, Faculty of
Social Sciences, Department of Political and Economic Studies, Economics,
P.O.Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7), FIN-00014 University of Helsinki, Finland
(email: Ulla.Lehmijoki@helsinki.fi) – Tapio Palokangas, University of Helsinki,
Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political and Economic Studies,
Economics, P.O.Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7), FIN-00014 University of Helsinki,
Finland. Phone (email: Tapio.Palokangas@helsinki.fi)
1 Introduction
In the post-war era, developing countries have faced a decrease in prema-
ture death since malaria and tuberculosis have been reduced, and infant and
maternal mortality have approached the standards of the advanced coun-
tries.1 This mortality decline has certainly been welfare enhancing, but has
it enhanced economic growth?
In the literature, the “Malthusian pessimists” claim that a mortality de-
cline inevitably leads to faster population growth and dilutes income per
person (Malthus 1798, Young 2005, Acemoglu and Johnson 2007). On the
other hand, the “optimists” claim that the extended lifetime helps economies
to escape the Malthusian trap since it stimulates investment in human cap-
ital. Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) and Ehrlich and Liu (2005) examine
endogenous mortality decline and Soares (2005) exogenous mortality decline
as the engine of economic growth. In line with these, Strauss and Thomas
(1998), Fogel (2004), and Weil (2007) argue that better nourished and health-
ier workers are more efficient, while Galor and Weil (2000) claim that popu-
lation growth accelerates technical progress.2
This paper provides an alternative channel from a mortality decline to
economic growth through the status of wealth (capital) in family preferences.
Since a decline in mortality generates a fall in the effective discount rate,
the present value of the future income flow increases. With higher income,
families start accumulating capital to raise their status and rearing more
children, which are a normal good in their preferences (the income effect).
Because the marginal utility of wealth through status is constant but the
utility of an extra child is decreasing, the families have no incentive to expand
to the level at which their wealth per person starts to decrease. In other
words, there is no Malthusian trap. Capital accumulation due to a mortality
decline increases the marginal product of labor, which raises the opportunity
1Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) attribute the postwar mortality decline in developing
countries to three factors: innovation of new drugs and chemicals, establishment of the
World Health Organization, and change in international values favoring the rapid spread of
new inventions. Hence, by the late 1940s, malaria was eradicated in many Asian countries
(Davis 1956, Preston 1975) and mortality from infectious and tuberculosis diseases has
decreased worldwide (Deaton 2003, Becker et al. 2005, Cutler et al. 2006).
2For a more complete literature review, see Acemoglu and Johnson (2007).
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cost of children (the substitution effect) until the population growth rate
starts to fall. Thus, status-seeking prevents excessive population growth
and, when it is strong, population growth decreases below its original level
in the long run. In the short run, population growth overshoots.
The importance of status has previously been recognized as follows: Smith
(1759) denotes the appreciation of productive assets the “Spirit of Capital-
ism” and Kurz (1968), Corneo and Jeanne (2001) and Fisher and Hof (2005)
use status to explore economic growth in advanced countries. But productive
assets provide status in developing countries as well (Gregory 1997, Diamond
1998). The key factor in status-seeking is the appreciation of capital rela-
tive to that of children. This is probably high in developing countries with
scarcity of capital and abundance of children, so that the status motivation
should be vital in these countries.
Empirical research has provided ambiguous results in terms of the effects
of a mortality decline. Zhang and Zhang (2005) show that an increase in life-
expectancy decreases fertility and increases the resources in schooling, thus
promoting economic growth, and Weil (2007) finds that the elimination of
health gaps decreases the variance in per capita income between countries.
On the other hand, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) introduce the concept
of “predicted mortality” by data, showing that a fall raises population more
than capital, thus decreasing per capitaGDP . A possible explanation for this
ambiguity is that post-war demographic trends have actually been markedly
different in, say, the Least Developed and Middle Income countries [Figures
1- 2]. Even though mortality fell rapidly everywhere, the response of fertility
was concomitant only in the Middle Income countries where the population
growth rate decreased while it increased in the Least Developed countries
[Fig. 2]. The patterns of economic growth have also been very different,
the economic slowdown in the 1960s and 1970s injuring the Least Developed
countries countries much more [Fig. 2], for instance.
This paper attempts to explain these differences in demographic and eco-
nomic patterns by differences in the desire for status. In addition to a fairly
general theoretical model, we provide some empirical qualifications by esti-
mating the preference parameters in a sample of 62 developing countries to
explain their post-war population growth. The empirical findings support
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Figure 1: Fertility and mortality (crude birth and death rates) in Least
Developed and Middle Income countries. Source and definition of groups:
United Nations (2008), World Bank (2009).
the theoretical model. If status-seeking is strong, a mortality decline tends
to retard (rather than accelerate) population growth.
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Figure 2: Demographic and economic growth rate in Least Developed and
Middle Income countries. Source: United Nations (2008).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the family optimiz-
ing model with status-seeking and Section 3 works out its solution. Sections
4 and 5 investigate the long-run and short-run effects of a mortality decline
on fertility and population growth. Section 6 provides evidence to support
the model and Section 7 summarizes the results. Technical and empirical
details appear in the Appendix.
3
2 Families
There is one good in the economy, chosen as the numeraire. We consider an
infinitely living representative family of L members, each of which either rear
children or work in the labor market. The population growth rate n equals
the fertility rate f minus the mortality rate m:
L˙
L
.
=
1
L
dL
dt
= n = f −m, (1)
where t is time and (˙) the derivative with respect to time. The number of
child-rearing family members, qfL, is in fixed proportion q to the number of
newborns fL. The rest of the family, L − qfL = (1 − qf)L, participates in
the labor force. Because the stock of productive capital, K, is the only asset
in the model, it is total wealth as well. The output Y of the single good is
produced from labor (1− qf)L and capital K according to constant returns
to scale:
Y = F
(
(1− qf)AL,K), F1 .= ∂F
∂[(1− qf)AL] > 0, F2
.
=
∂F
∂K
> 0,
F11
.
=
∂2F
∂[(1− qf)AL]2 < 0, F22
.
=
∂F
∂K2
< 0, F12
.
=
∂2F
∂[(1− qf)AL]∂K > 0,
F linearly homogeneous, (2)
where A is the productivity of labor. We assume Harrod-neutral technologi-
cal change with a constant growth rate µ:3
A˙
A
.
=
1
A
dA
dt
= µ > 0. (3)
We denote consumption by C, consumption per efficiency unit of labor
by c
.
= C/(AL) and capital per efficiency unit of labor by k
.
= K/(AL).
Following Razin and Ben-Zion (1975) and Becker (1991), we consider a rep-
resentative family that derives utility from per capita consumption C/L and
the proportion of children in population n (= the population growth rate). In
addition, the family benefits from its status in the society. This is proxied by
its wealth per efficiency unit of labor, k, over and above the average wealth
3This exogenous technological change plays no role in the theoretical analysis, but
makes the model more compatible with the empirical part in Section 6.
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per efficiency unit of labor in the whole economy, κ. Thus, we augment the
temporary utility at time t by an increasing function v(k − κ) of the status
k − κ as follows:4
u(t) = log(C/L) + θ log n(t) + εv
(
k(t)− κ(t)) =
log c(t) + logA(t) + θ log n(t) + εv
(
k(t)− κ(t)), θ > 0, v′ > 0, v′(0) = 1,
(4)
where θ and ε are the constant weights for children and status. The greater
ε is, the greater the desire for status due to wealth. The bigger θ is, the more
children the families would like to have.
In the literature, it is commonly assumed that wealth yields utility, ε > 0.
In this paper, we accept that families may weakly “dislike” wealth,
−(1 + qF12)/(k + qF1) < ε < 0, (5)
but accumulate capital to use it as an input for production.
Let the constant ρ be a family member’s rate of time preference given
that (s)he could live forever. We assume that all family members face the
same mortality rate m. Thus, the probability of a member dying in a short
time dt is equal to mdt. In that case, e−mt is the probability that the family
member will survive beyond the period [0, t], and e−mtu(t) is the member’s
expected utility at time t. Noting (1), (4) and (5), the representative family’s
expected utility at time t = 0 is then given by
U =
∫ ∞
0
(ue−mt)e−ρtdt =
∫ ∞
0
[
log c+ θ log(f −m) + εv(k − κ)]e−(ρ+m)tdt,
v′ > 0, v′′ < 0, v′(0) = 1, ρ > 0, θ > 0, ε > −1 + qF12
k + qF1
, (6)
where ρ+m is the effective discount rate in family preferences.5
The family budget constraint can be written as follows:
K˙
.
= dK/dt = Y − C − δK, δ ∈ (0, 1), (7)
4If the measure for status, v, were a linearly homogeneous function of k and κ, we
would obtain the same results with some complication.
5Soares (2005) argues that the increase in human planning horizon (decreases in the
effective discount rate ρ +m) is mainly due to a decrease in adult mortality, whereas a
decrease in infant mortality decreases the costs of having a live descendant. We do not
discriminate between adult and child mortality, for simplicity.
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where K˙ is capital accumulation, Y income from production, C total con-
sumption and δ > 0 the constant rate of capital depreciation. Noting
c
.
= C/(AL), k
.
= K/(AL), (1) and (2), the budget constraint (7) can be
expressed relative to efficient labor AL as follows:6
k˙ =
K˙
AL
− K
AL
(
A˙
A
+
L˙
L
)
= F (1− qf, k) + (m− f − µ− δ)k − c. (8)
3 The dynamics of the model
The family maximizes its utility (6) by choosing its fertility f and consump-
tion per efficiency unit of labor, c, subject to capital accumulation (8). The
Hamiltonian of this maximization is given by
H = log c+ logA+ θ log(f −m) + ²v(k − κ)
+ λ[F (1− qf, k) + (m− f − µ− δ)k − c], (9)
where the co-state variable λ evolves according to
λ˙ = (ρ+m)λ− ∂H/∂k = [ρ+ f + µ+ δ − F2(1− qf, k)]λ− εv′(k − κ),
lim
t→∞
λke−(ρ+m)t = 0. (10)
The maximization of the Hamiltonian (9) by the control variables (c, f)
for a given λ yields the first-order conditions
∂H
∂c
=
1
c
− λ = 0, ∂H
∂f
=
θ
f −m −
[
qF1(1− qf, k) + k
]
λ = 0.
Given these two equations, (2) and (6), we can replace λ by f as the co-state
variable and define per capita consumption c as a function of capital k, the
6In Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), a decline in mortality is a direct input in the pro-
duction function together with labor and capital. In that case, a decrease in mortality has
two opposing effects on per capita GNP: The direct effect, i.e., a decrease in mortality,
increases both human capital and total factor productivity, and the indirect effect, i.e.,
with limited resources (land and capital), an increase of population tends to decrease per
capita GNP. In the model in this paper, a decline in mortality m generates no productivity
changes but has an effect only through the dynamics of the economy by increasing the
effective rate of time preference, ρ +m [cf. (6)] and by retarding capital accumulation k˙
[cf. (8)]. These differences in model specification lead to different growth patterns after a
mortality shock.
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fertility rate n and the mortality rate m as follows:
c
.
= 1/λ = z(k, f,m)/θ > 0, z(k, f,m)
.
= (f −m)[qF1(1− qf, k) + k],
f > m, zk
.
=
∂z
∂k
=
∂ log z
∂k
z =
1 + qF12
k + qF1
z > 0, zm
.
=
∂z
∂m
= −qF1 − k < 0,
zf
.
=
∂z
∂f
= qF1 + k︸︷︷︸
+
−(f −m︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
) q2︸︷︷︸
+
F11︸︷︷︸
−
> qF1 + k = −zm > 0. (11)
Inserting function (11) into the differential equation (8), capital accumu-
lation k˙ can be defined as a function of the variables (k, f,m) as follows:
k˙ = F (1− qf, k) + (m− f − µ− δ)k − z(k, f,m)/θ. (12)
Noting (2) and (11), this function has the properties:
∂k˙
∂f
= −qF1 − k − zf
θ
< 0,
∂k˙
∂k
= F2 +m− f − µ− δ − zk
θ
,
∂k˙
∂m
= k − zm
θ
> 0. (13)
On the assumption that all families are similar in the economy, they have
the same wealth in equilibrium, κ = k. Given κ = k, (6) and (11), we can
transform the differential equation (10) into
ρ+ f + µ+ δ − F2(1− qf, k)− εz(k, f,m)/θ
= ρ+ f + µ+ δ − F2(1− qf, k)− v′(0)ε/λ
=
λ˙
λ
=
d log λ
dt
= − d
dt
log z(k, f,m) = −zk
z
k˙ − zf
z
f˙ . (14)
Thus
F2 − f − µ− δ = ρ− εz/θ ⇔ k˙ = f˙ = 0. (15)
Rearranging terms in (14) and noting (2), (6), (11), (13) and (15), we obtain
the change in the fertility rate, f˙ , as a function of the variables (k, f,m) as:
f˙ = −zk
zf
k˙ +
z
zf
[
F2(1− qf, k) + ε
θ
z(k, f,m)− f − µ− δ − ρ
]
(16)
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with
∂f˙
∂k
∣∣∣∣
k˙=f˙=0
=
z
zf
(ε
θ
zk + F22
)
− zk
zf
∂k˙
∂k
=
z
zf
(ε
θ
zk + F22
)
− zk
zf
(
F2 +m− f − µ− δ − zk
θ
)
=
z
zf
(ε
θ
zk + F22
)
− zk
zf
(
m+ ρ− z ε
θ
− zk
θ
)
=
z
zf︸︷︷︸
+
[
F22︸︷︷︸
−
− zk
z︸︷︷︸
+
(
m+ ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
− zk
θ︸︷︷︸
+
)]
,
(17)
∂f˙
∂f
∣∣∣∣
k˙=f˙=0
=
z
zf
(ε
θ
zf − 1− qF12
)
− zk
zf
∂k˙
∂f
=
z
zf
(ε
θ
zf − 1− qF12
)
+
zk
zf
(
qF1 + k +
zf
θ
)
=
ε
θ
z− z
zf
(
1 + qF12
)
+
zk
zf
(
qF1 + k
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
zk
θ
=
ε
θ
z +
zk
θ
=
z
θ
(
ε+
zk
z
)
=
z
θ
(
ε+
1 + qF12
k + qF1
)
> 0, (18)
∂f˙
∂m
∣∣∣∣
k˙=f˙=0
=
z
zf
ε
θ︸︷︷︸
+
zm︸︷︷︸
−
− zk
zf︸︷︷︸
+
∂k˙
∂m︸︷︷︸
+
< 0. (19)
4 Long-run effects of mortality shocks
The system (12) and (16) of capital per efficiency unit of labor, k, and the
fertility rate f can be linearized in the neighborhood of the steady state
k˙ = f˙ = 0:(
∂k˙/∂k ∂k˙/∂f
∂f˙/∂k ∂f˙/∂f
)(
dk
df
)
+
(
∂k˙/∂m ∂k˙/∂ ε
θ
∂f˙/∂m ∂f˙/∂ ε
θ
)(
dm
d ε
θ
)
= 0. (20)
Noting (13), (15) and (18), the trace of this system is positive in the neigh-
borhood of the steady state k˙ = f˙ = 0:
∂k˙
∂k
+
∂f˙
∂f
= F2 +m− f − µ− δ − zk
θ
+
ε
θ
z +
zk
θ
= F2 +m− f − µ− δ + ε
θ
z = ρ+m > 0.
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With a positive trace, there are two alternative solutions. First, if the Ja-
cobian J is positive, then the system is globally unstable, any perturbation
taking the system from the steady state forever. No economy behaves in this
way. Second, if the Jacobian J is negative, then the system has a saddle
point, there being only one initial value of the jump variable f that leads to
the steady state. We focus on this latter case.
The negativity of the Jacobian J implies
∂k˙
∂k
∂f˙
∂f
<
∂k˙
∂f
∂f˙
∂k
. (21)
Thus, noting (1), (2), (13), (15), (19) and (20), the steady state capital stock
per efficiency unit of labor, k∗, fertility rate f ∗, and population growth rate
n∗ are functions of the mortality rate m and preferences for wealth relative
to children, ε/θ, f ∗(m, ε/θ), n∗(m, ε/θ), and k∗(m, ε/θ). Thus, the effects of
a mortality shock can be analyzed by (cf. Appendix A):7
∂f ∗
∂m
= − z
zf︸︷︷︸
+
1
J︸︷︷︸
−
[
a
(ε
θ
)2
+ b
ε
θ
− h
]{ ≥ 0 for ε/θ ≥ W ,
(< 0 for ε/θ < W ),
(22)
∂n∗
∂m
= − z
zf︸︷︷︸
+
1
J︸︷︷︸
−
[
a
(ε
θ
)2
+ b
ε
θ
− h− g
]{ ≥ 0 for ε/θ ≥ V ,
< 0 for ε/θ < V ,
V > W,
(23)
∂k∗/∂m < 0, (24)
where a > 0, b < 0, h > 0 and g > 0 are constants in the neighborhood
of the steady state, the constant W is the positive root of the polynomial
a(ε/θ)2+b(ε/θ)−h = 0 and the constant V the positive root of the polynomial
a(ε/θ)2 + b(ε/θ)− h− g = 0.
Results (22)-(24) can be rephrased as follows:
7Given that fertility increases are rarely observed in the post-war data, we put the
second case in (22) in parenthesis [Fig. 1].
9
Proposition 1 An exogenous decline in the mortality rate m generates the
following long-run effects:
(i) the fertility rate f decreases but the population growth rate n increases
for 0 < W < ε/θ < V ,
(ii) both the fertility rate f and the population growth rate n decrease for
ε/θ > V ,
(iii) capital per efficiency unit of labor, k, increases.
Noting (23), we can define the change in the long-run population growth
rate after a mortality decline ∆m < 0 by the mean value theorem as follows:
∆n =
∂n∗
∂m
∆m︸︷︷︸
−
= − ∆m
zf︸︷︷︸
−
z
J︸︷︷︸
−
[
a︸︷︷︸
+
(ε
θ
)2
+ b
ε
θ
− h− g
]
,
(25)
where ∂n∗/∂m is evaluated at some point ξ ∈ [m + ∆m,m]. Equation (25)
implies the following result:
Proposition 2 If the mortality rate m falls exogenously, ∆m < 0, then the
change in the population growth rate, ∆n, follows an inverted-U curve as a
function of ε/θ [Fig. 3].
The inverted-U shape in Fig. 3 refers to the competing roles of children
and status in preferences:
Income effect. Since a mortality decline raises the present value of future
income, the demand for children increases.
Substitution effect. Status-seeking generates capital accumulation, which in-
creases the marginal product of labor and the opportunity cost of child
rearing. Consequently, the demand for children decreases.
For low values of ε/θ, the income effect dominates (the rising segment of the
inverted-U), while for high ε/θ, the substitution effect dominates (the falling
segment of the inverted-U). If the desire for status is strong (i.e., ε/θ > V ),
the population growth rate decreases in the long run, ∆n < 0.
10
Change in the population growth rate
		 ∆n
ε/θV0
Figure 3: The effect of a mortality shock on the steady state population
growth rate n∗ as a function of ε/θ.
Proposition 1(iii) shows that economies escape the Malthusian trap even
when population growth increases (∆n > 0). This is due to status-seeking,
in which the relative (not absolute) wealth per person, k, plays a crucial role
[cf. (4)]. When k grows at the same rate for all families, the marginal utility
of capital per person is kept constant. Therefore, capital accumulation raises
the family’s welfare linearly, while an increase in the number of children is
subject to diminishing marginal utility [cf. (4)]. This asymmetry ensures
that population will never grow faster than capital, i.e., the Malthusian trap
is not possible.
5 Short-run effects of mortality shocks
5.1 The fertility choice
Assume first that the system is initially in the steady state (k∗0, f
∗
0 ). Once
m decreases, the steady state moves to (k∗1, f
∗
1 ). Given Proposition 1, the
capital-labor ratio k rises but the fertility rate f falls, k∗0 < k
∗
1 and f
∗
0 > f
∗
1 .
Given (13), (18) and (21), the singular curve (k˙ = 0) necessarily has a smaller
slope than the singular curve (f˙ = 0) in the (k, f) space:
∂f
∂k
∣∣∣∣
k˙=0
= − ∂k˙
∂k
/
∂k˙
∂f︸︷︷︸
−
< − ∂f˙
∂k
/
∂f˙
∂f︸︷︷︸
+
=
∂f
∂k
∣∣∣∣
f˙=0
. (26)
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Since ∂k˙/∂f < 0 by (13), the variable k increases (decreases) below (above)
the singular curve (k˙ = 0). Since ∂f˙/∂f > 0 by (18), the variable f increases
(decreases) above (below) the singular curve (f˙ = 0).
The dynamics of the system depends on the ambiguous sign of the partial
derivative ∂f˙/∂k. We consider the case ∂f˙/∂k > 0 here. The empirically
less relevant case with ∂f˙/∂k < 0 is discussed in Appendix B.
k
f
S
S
.
 f = 0
.
k*
f *
 k = 0
.
Figure 4: The saddle point in the (k, f) space.
Given ∂f˙/∂k > 0 and (13), (18) and (21), it holds true that
∂f˙
∂k
> 0,
∂k˙
∂f
< 0,
∂f˙
∂f
> 0, 0 >
∂k˙
∂f︸︷︷︸
−
∂f˙
∂k︸︷︷︸
+
>
∂k˙
∂k
∂f˙
∂f︸︷︷︸
+
,
∂k˙
∂k
< 0. (27)
This and (26) imply that both singular curves (k˙ = 0) and (f˙ = 0) are
decreasing, but (k˙ = 0) falls more steeply than (f˙ = 0) [Fig. 4]
∂f
∂k
∣∣∣∣
k˙=0
= − ∂k˙
∂k︸︷︷︸
−
/
∂k˙
∂f︸︷︷︸
−
< − ∂f˙
∂k︸︷︷︸
+
/
∂f˙
∂f︸︷︷︸
+
=
∂f
∂k
∣∣∣∣
f˙=0
< 0.
Consider now the response of the system to a mortality shock. Noting (13),
(19) and (27), we obtain the result that both curves (k˙ = 0) and (f˙ = 0)
shift to the left [Fig. 5]:
∂k
∂m
∣∣∣∣
k˙=0
= − ∂k˙
∂m︸︷︷︸
+
/
∂k˙
∂k︸︷︷︸
−
> 0,
∂k
∂m
∣∣∣∣
f˙=0
= − ∂f˙
∂m︸︷︷︸
−
/
∂f˙
∂k︸︷︷︸
+
> 0. (28)
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Figure 5: The dynamics of capital k and fertility f .
From (28) it follows that when m decreases, the control variable f jumps
downwards from f0 to fˆ [Fig. 5]. After this, the system evolves along the sad-
dle path SS to the new steady state (k∗1, f
∗
1 ). Thus, fertility f decreases and
capital k increases gradually until the new steady state (k∗1, f
∗
1 ) is attained.
5.2 The population growth rate n
To examine the dynamics of the population growth rate n, we transform the
system (12) and (16) from the (k, f) space into the (k, n) space by inserting
f = n+m into it [cf. (1)]. Noting (13), (19) and (27), in the neighborhood
of the steady state k˙ = n˙ = 0, this new system has the properties
∂k˙
∂k
∣∣∣∣
f=n+m
=
∂k˙
∂k
< 0,
∂k˙
∂n
∣∣∣∣
f=n+m
=
∂k˙
∂f
< 0,
∂k˙
∂m
∣∣∣∣
f=n+m
=
∂k˙
∂m︸︷︷︸
+
+
∂k˙
∂f︸︷︷︸
−
df
dm︸︷︷︸
=1
,
∂n˙
∂k
∣∣∣∣
f=n+m
=
∂f˙
∂k
> 0,
∂n˙
∂n
∣∣∣∣
f=n+m
=
∂f˙
∂f
> 0,
∂n˙
∂m
∣∣∣∣
f=n+m
=
∂f˙
∂m︸︷︷︸
−
+
∂f˙
∂f︸︷︷︸
+
df
dm︸︷︷︸
=1
,
[
∂k˙
∂k
∂f˙
∂f
]
f=n+m
>
[
∂k˙
∂f
∂f˙
∂k
]
f=n+m.
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Figure 6: The saddle point in the (k, n) space.
These results imply that both singular curves (k˙ = 0) and (n˙ = 0) are
decreasing, but the curve (k˙ = 0) falls more steeply than the curve (n˙ = 0)
[Fig.6].
The immediate fall in the birth rate f after a decrease in mortality m
[Fig. 5] raises the question of whether and on what conditions the immediate
change in the population growth rate n = f−m is positive. To examine this,
assume that mortalitym falls fromm0 tom1. Then, applying the mean value
theorem, we obtain
f ∗1 − f ∗0 =
df(ξ)
dm
∣∣∣∣
ξ∈(m0,m1)
(m1 −m0). (29)
From Proposition 1(ii), equation (29) and Fig. 6 we obtain
df
dm
< 1 and 0 < f ∗0 − f̂ < f ∗0 − f ∗1 =
df(ξ)
dm
∣∣∣∣
ξ∈(m0,m1)
(m0 −m1︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
) < m0 −m1
for W < ε/θ < V . This and n = f −m imply that
n∗0 − n̂ = f ∗0 − f̂ − (m0 −m1) < 0 for W < ε/θ < V .
Noting Proposition 1(ii), this result can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 3 If mortality m falls exogenously, then the population growth
rate increases in the short run, n̂ > n∗0, but decreases in the long run, n
∗
1 < n
∗
0,
for W < ε/θ < V .
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Figure 7: The dynamics of capital k and the population growth rate n.
6 Qualifications, the long run
Proposition 1 predicts that in the long run the population growth rate first
increases and then decreases as a function of ε/θ [Fig. 3]. To test this
prediction, we make an effort to estimate the unobserved parameters ε and
θ from the post-war data and regress the change in population growth ∆n
against these estimates.
As the first step, note that since 1 − qf is the labor force participation
rate, one can simply calculate q = (1 − participation rate/f).8 Then, on
the assumption that countries have followed their optimal paths, and that
they are so close to their steady states that k = κ and v′(0) = 1 hold true,
equations (11) and (14) can be solved for θ and ε as follows
θ = {(f −m)[qF1(1− qf, k) + k]}/c (30)
ε =
[
ρ+ f + µ+ δ − F2(1− qf, k) + c˙/c
]
/c. (31)
Equation (30) is relatively straightforward since no unobservables exist on
its right hand side. In contrast, (31) contains the subjective discount rate ρ,
the rate of technical progress µ, and the depreciation rate δ, indicating that
ε can only be estimated conditional on assumptions from these variables.
Since households in developing countries tend to be impatient, we assume
ρ = 0.15, while the other assumptions δ = 0.05 and µ = 0.015 are standard.
We assume that all countries share these values.
8For data sources, definitions of the variables, and estimation details, see Appendix C.
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For the production function, we adopt the Cobb-Douglas formula:
Y = F
(
(1− qf)AL,K) = [(1− qf)A(0)eµtL]1−αKα (32)
To estimate the parameters of (32), we collect time series for GDP and in-
vestment for the 1950-2007 period from developing countries. The capital
stocks K are calculated from investment time series by the perpetual inven-
tory method (Caselli 2004). Since no fixed factor (land) is included in the
model, we consider the non-agricultural GDP and labor force alone, assum-
ing that all investments are devoted to non-agricultural capital. Thus, by
dividing both sides of (32) by (1− qf)eµtL and taking logs, one gets
ln
Y
(1− qf)eµtL = lnA(0)
1−α + α · ln K
(1− qf)eµtL. (33)
By applying this for all available years, the parameters A(0) and α can be
estimated for each country i separately by OLS. For the derived estimates
and R2-values, see Appendix C.
Given the parametric expression for the production function, one can
calculate the preference parameters θ and ε from (30) and (31) for each year
in each country. However, because θ and ε will be used to explain fertility,
we apply data only from 1960-1970 to derive (the average values of) θ and ε.
In this way, we alleviate the potential endogeneity arising from the presence
of fertility in (30) and (31). The estimates for θ and ε are given in Appendix
C. Note that the estimated ε is negative for some countries [cf. (5)].9
It is now possible to regress the post-war change in the population growth
rate ∆ni against (ε/θ)i. We use three alternative models:
Model I : ∆ni = ζ + β (ε/θ)i + γ (ε/θi)
2 + ²i,
Model II : ∆ni = ζ + β (ε/θ)i + ²i,
Model III : ∆ni = ζ + β (ε/θ)i + η group+ ²i,
where ζ, β and γ are parameters. The sample of 62 countries in Figure
8 (panel a) indicates that the data really exhibits the expected inverse-U
9The sensitivity analysis shows that the estimates for θ and ε are quite insensitive to the
assumed values of δ and µ, because these values contribute directly in (30) and (31) and
indirectly through (33) and capital stock. The subjective time preference ρi contributes
only directly (multiplied by 1/ci which varies moderately) so that larger (smaller) assumed
values shift the scatter plot in Figure 8 to the right (left) without changing its shape much.
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Figure 8: The change in the population growth rate (in percentage units) as
a function of ε/θ.
shape [cf. Fig. 3]. Therefore, we first fit the quadratic formula given by
Model I. The results in Table 1 show that both the first and second degree
terms are significant at the 10% level but the explanatory power ofModel I is
low. Figure 8 indicates indeed that just three countries (Botswana, Lesotho,
and Burundi) are responsible for the quadratic shape.10 Hence, we exclude
these countries and fit a simple linear model (Model II ) to approximate the
downward-sloping segment of the inverted-U for the rest of the sample. Table
1 shows that ε/θ significantly explains the change in population growth but
that the explanatory power is still low. Only after including an intercept
dummy group for the Middle Income countries (Model III ) do we derive
satisfactory results. These results show that the change in population growth
∆n depends on the relative desire for status ε/θ in a statistically significant
way. Model III explains 36% of the post-war change in population growth,
thus confirming the main theoretical findings in Proposition 1.
This empirical analysis is subject to several caveats and restrictions. One
of these is omitted-variable bias, since only the variables of the current model
are considered, but many other factors (e.g., government spending, taxes,
trade, literacy and political stability) are likely to affect ε/θ. We leave the
introduction of additional explanatory variables into the family optimization
model as a future challenge.
10These countries are actually statistical outliers as their observed values exceed the
average by more than 2 ∗ std.
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Model I Model II Model III
estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate p-value
constant -0.0072 2.6E-07 -0.0075 4.5E-08 -0.00015 0.9373
ε/θ -0.0057 0.0718 -0.0052 0.0218 -0.0044 0.0245
(ε/θ)2 -0.0017 0.0808
group -0.0105 1.2E-05
R2 0.06 0.09 0.36
Countries 62 59 59
Table 1: Estimation results, dependent variable ∆n.
7 Conclusions
This paper provides a causal link between a decline in mortality and de-
mographic and economic growth through the status resulting from relative
wealth. A decline in mortality decreases the effective rate of time preference
and increases the present value of the expected income flow. Because chil-
dren are normal goods in preferences, a higher present value of income boosts
both capital accumulation and the demand for children. Capital accumula-
tion increases wages and the opportunity cost of child-rearing and compels
the birth rate to fall in the long run.
In contrast to Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), the economy escapes the
Malthusian trap because relative (not absolute) capital per person plays an
important role in status-seeking. When capital per person grows at the same
rate in all families, its marginal utility is kept constant, whereas children are
subject to diminishing marginal utility. This asymmetry ensures that pop-
ulation will never grow faster than capital, i.e., the status of relative wealth
prevents the excessive acceleration of population growth and eliminates the
Malthusian trap. If the desire for status is strong, then the income effect
from a fall in mortality leads to accumulating wealth rather than to having
more children. In that case, the population growth rate falls below its origi-
nal level in the long run. In the short run, the population growth rate spurts
and overshoots. The evidence, provided by regressing the post-war change in
population growth in developing countries against the estimated preference
parameters, confirms these theoretical results.
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A Appendix: Technical Details
Given the system (20), we obtain the functions k∗(m, ε/θ) and n∗(m, ε/θ).
Noting J < 0, (1), (2), (11), (13), (15), (19) and (20), these functions have
the following properties
∂k∗
∂m
= − 1
J
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂k˙∂m ∂k˙∂f∂f˙
∂m
∂f˙
∂f
∣∣∣∣∣ = − 1J
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂k˙∂m ∂k˙∂fz
zf
ε
θ
zm − zkzf ∂k˙∂m zzf
(
ε
θ
zf − 1− qF12
)− zk
zf
∂k˙
∂f
∣∣∣∣∣
= − 1
J
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂k˙∂m ∂k˙∂fz
zf
ε
θ
zm
z
zf
(
ε
θ
zf − 1− qF12
) ∣∣∣∣∣
= − 1
J
∣∣∣∣ k − zmθ −qF1 − k − zfθz
zf
ε
θ
zm
z
zf
(
ε
θ
zf − 1− qF12
) ∣∣∣∣ = − 1J
∣∣∣∣ k − zmθ −qF1 − kz
zf
ε
θ
zm
z
zf
(−1− qF12)
∣∣∣∣
=
k
J︸︷︷︸
−
z
zf︸︷︷︸
+
(
1 + qF12︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)− 1
J
∣∣∣∣ − zmθ −qF1 − kz
zf
ε
θ
zm
z
zf
(−1− qF12)
∣∣∣∣
< − 1
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zf
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zm
z
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(−1− qF12)
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∣∣∣∣ −1 −qF1 − kε −1− qF12
∣∣∣∣
= − z
zf︸︷︷︸
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1
J︸︷︷︸
−
zm︸︷︷︸
−
[(1 + qF12)/θ + (qF1 + k)ε/θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
] < 0,
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∂ ε
θ
= − 1
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∣∣∣∣∣
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J
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ρ− z ε
θ
+m− zk
zm
k
)ε
θ
zm +
(zm
θ
− k︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
)
F22︸︷︷︸
−
]
= − z
zf︸︷︷︸
+
1
J︸︷︷︸
−
[
a
(ε
θ
)2
+ b
ε
θ
− h
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> 0 for ε/θ > W ,
= 0 for ε/θ = W ,
< 0 for ε/θ < W ,
∂n∗
∂m
=
∂(f ∗ −m∗)
∂m
=
∂f ∗
dm
− 1 = − z
zf
1
J
[
a
(ε
θ
)2
+ b
ε
θ
− h
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− 1
= − z
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+
1
J︸︷︷︸
−
[
a
(ε
θ
)2
+ b
ε
θ
− h− g
]
> 0 for ε/θ > V ,
= 0 for ε/θ = V ,
< 0 for ε/θ < V ,
V > W,
where a
.
= −zzm > 0, b .= (ρ + m)zm − kzk < 0, h .= k − zm/θ > 0,
g
.
= −(zf/z)J > 0, the constant W is the positive root of the polynomial
a(ε/θ)2+b(ε/θ)−h = 0 and the constant V the positive root of the polynomial
a(ε/θ)2 + b(ε/θ)− h− g = 0.
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B Appendix: The Case ∂f˙/∂k < 0
In this case, given (18) and (26), we obtain the result that (f˙ = 0) is increas-
ing, but (k˙ = 0) is increasing or decreasing, and (f˙ = 0) rises more steeply
than (k˙ = 0) in the (k, f) space [Fig. 9]
∂f
∂k
∣∣∣∣
f˙=0
= − ∂f˙
∂k︸︷︷︸
−
/
∂f˙
∂f︸︷︷︸
+
> 0.
Noting (13), (19) and (27), we obtain the result that with the decline of m
the curve (f˙ = 0) shifts to the right and the curve (k˙ = 0) downwards:
∂k
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−
< 0,
∂f
∂m
∣∣∣∣
k˙=0
= − ∂k˙
∂m︸︷︷︸
+
/
∂k˙
∂f︸︷︷︸
−
> 0.
k
f
S
S
.
.
(k = 0)
.
1
(k = 0)
.
0
(f = 0)
.0(f = 0)
1
k 0* k 1*
f o*
f1*
f^
k
f
S
S.
.
(k = 0)
.
1
(k = 0)
.
0
(f = 0)
.
0(f = 0)
1
k 0* k 1*
f o*
f1*
f^
Figure 9: The dynamics of capital k and the population growth rate n; the
case ∂f˙/∂k < 0.
The dynamics of the system, given in Fig. 9, is independent of the slope
of (k˙ = 0). When m decreases, the control variable f jumps downwards from
f0 to fˆ . After this, the system evolves along the saddle path SS to the new
steady state (k∗1, f
∗
1 ). Consequently, the birth rate f decreases but overshoots
its long-run change, f ∗0 − f̂ > f ∗0 − f ∗1 , and capital k increases gradually until
the new steady state (k∗1, f
∗
1 ) is attained. This predicts that a mortality de-
cline decreases the fertility rate f in the short run more than in the long run.
Since this pattern of development is incompatible with empirical evidence
(cf. Fig. 1), we ignore the case ∂f˙/∂k < 0 in this document.
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C Appendix: Estimated Parameters
Country α A R2 θ ε ε/θ ∆n group
Albania 0.15 2822.87 0.04 0.689 0.539 0.783 -0.021 Middle
Algeria 0.43 2452.17 0.23 3.793 0.858 0.230 -0.015 Middle
Angola 0.39 3528.95 0.16 2.242 0.695 0.310 0.004 Middle
Argentina 0.23 9585.27 0.06 0.817 0.320 0.418 -0.005 Middle
Benin 0.18 2097.97 0.19 1.555 0.759 0.462 0.013 Least
Bolivia 0.80 337.70 0.71 0.310 -0.025 -0.087 -0.004 Middle
Botswana 0.62 4993.15 0.95 1.138 -3.965 -3.976 -0.020 Middle
Brazil 0.93 0.44 0.89 0.164 0.000 0.000 -0.019 Middle
Burundi 0.80 1675.03 0.69 1.418 -3.443 -3.788 -0.003 Least
Cambodia 0.38 1402.69 0.03 0.369 -0.068 -0.185 -0.006 Least
Cameroon 0.20 7771.19 0.14 2.002 -0.046 -0.036 -0.001 Middle
Central African 0.97 0.00 0.97 0.123 0.000 0.000 0.001 Least
Chile 0.29 7256.77 0.09 1.405 0.712 0.395 -0.016 Middle
China 0.97 0.00 0.97 0.177 0.000 0.000 0.010 Middle
Costa Rica 0.29 7182.22 0.55 1.070 0.175 0.163 -0.020 Middle
Cote d‘Ivoire 0.40 4649.60 0.71 1.636 0.054 0.014 -0.005 Middle
Dominican Republic 0.75 483.40 0.96 0.366 -0.017 -0.066 -0.018 Middle
Egypt 0.59 3443.71 0.75 0.636 -0.754 -1.177 -0.007 Middle
El Salvador 0.08 6397.20 0.02 1.140 0.497 0.416 -0.018 Middle
Ethiopia 0.21 2383.27 0.65 1.581 0.425 0.266 0.003 Least
Gabon 0.69 11872.53 0.38 0.656 -1.675 -2.353 0.012 Middle
Guinea-Bissau 0.54 197.89 0.42 0.787 0.085 0.122 0.010 Least
Guyana 0.68 3.78 0.51 1.712 0.001 0.001 -0.018 Middle
Honduras 0.46 1847.08 0.28 1.167 0.165 0.149 -0.008 Middle
India 0.76 336.43 0.91 0.560 -0.080 -0.147 -0.008 Middle
Indonesia 0.71 743.83 0.97 0.542 -0.360 -0.682 -0.009 Middle
Iran 0.23 8780.02 0.11 3.185 1.132 0.349 -0.015 Middle
Kenya 0.55 2666.76 0.85 1.299 -0.021 -0.045 -0.004 Least
Lesotho 0.42 622.80 0.93 0.140 -0.354 -3.805 -0.013 Middle
Madagascar 0.66 2862.65 0.90 0.698 -0.941 -1.332 0.003 Least
Malawi 0.17 2910.23 0.25 2.578 1.167 0.421 0.000 Least
Malaysia 0.69 1868.10 0.98 0.544 -0.270 -0.541 -0.013 Middle
Mali 0.73 1294.17 0.66 0.938 -0.747 -0.834 0.012 Least
Mauritania 0.27 2948.27 0.11 7.060 9.912 0.652 -0.001 Least
Mexico 0.63 2024.07 0.90 0.738 0.011 0.013 -0.018 Middle
Mongolia 0.71 29.58 0.69 0.836 0.007 0.009 -0.010 Middle
Morocco 0.39 4802.68 0.22 1.224 0.437 0.314 -0.015 Middle
Mozambique 0.10 4029.68 0.02 1.355 0.258 0.200 -0.001 Least
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Country α A R2 θ ε ε/θ ∆n group
Namibia 0.54 5505.53 0.41 1.047 -0.034 -0.014 -0.010 Middle
Nepal 0.49 2683.56 0.96 1.191 -0.280 -0.263 0.002 Least
Nicaragua 0.98 0.00 0.40 0.132 0.000 0.000 -0.012 Middle
Niger 0.39 3652.36 0.34 2.841 0.415 0.169 0.002 Least
Pakistan 0.40 2295.07 0.73 1.245 -0.041 -0.067 -0.004 Middle
Panama 0.68 788.35 0.90 0.607 -0.011 -0.010 -0.014 Middle
Papua New Guinea 0.35 3404.08 0.60 2.332 0.416 0.186 0.002 Middle
Paraguay 0.31 3418.35 0.79 0.954 0.067 0.091 -0.014 Middle
Peru 0.28 4308.17 0.28 1.422 0.509 0.453 -0.012 Middle
Philippines 0.56 1581.81 0.62 0.734 0.006 0.001 -0.011 Middle
Sierra Leone 0.83 949.29 0.26 0.144 -0.189 -1.310 0.008 Least
Solomon Islands 0.98 0.00 0.61 0.162 0.000 0.000 -0.005 Middle
South Africa 0.50 7255.56 0.52 0.649 -0.198 -0.307 -0.019 Middle
Sudan 0.46 1342.51 0.28 1.394 0.283 0.203 -0.004 Middle
Syria 0.48 2227.45 0.58 1.149 -1.065 -0.883 -0.006 Middle
Thailand 0.75 167.74 0.98 0.779 -0.001 -0.002 -0.025 Middle
Togo 0.63 284.24 0.43 0.629 0.059 0.071 -0.001 Least
Tunisia 0.70 531.55 0.06 0.814 0.012 0.021 -0.016 Middle
Turkey 0.66 1834.62 0.98 0.815 -0.025 -0.041 -0.015 Middle
Uruguay 0.24 6401.57 0.20 0.549 0.232 0.372 -0.008 Middle
Venezuela 0.69 1099.08 0.75 1.384 0.012 0.007 -0.019 Middle
Vietnam 0.80 525.05 0.95 0.255 -0.309 -1.213 -0.010 Least
Zambia 0.97 0.00 0.87 0.208 0.000 0.000 -0.003 Least
Zimbabwe 0.37 3219.62 0.17 2.009 0.268 0.170 -0.019 Least
The variables, their sources, and maximal data availability are:
Participation rate = Total labor force participation rate. Source: World
Bank (2009), 1960-2007.
GDP = real gross domestic product, base year 2005, Laspayres index. Source:
Heston et al. (2009), 1950-2007.
Investment = proportion of investment in GDP. Source: Heston et al.
(2009), 1950-2007.
Agricultural participation rate = The proportion of the total labor force in
agricultural sector. Source: World Bank (2009), 1960-2007.
Agricultural GDP =The proportion of GDP from agricultural sector. Source:
World Bank (2009), 1960-2007.
Fertility f = crude birth rate, number of births per thousand people. Source:
Annual data from World Bank (2009), 1960-2007. Periodical estimates from
United Nations (2008), 1950/55-2000/05.
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Mortality m = crude death rate, number of deaths per thousand people.
Source: Annual data from World Bank (2009), 1960-2007. Periodical esti-
mates from United Nations (2008), 1950/55-2000/05.
Population growth n = f−m. Source: Annual data fromWorld Bank (2009).
1960-2007. Periodical estimates from United Nations (2008), 1950/55-2000/05.
The data was initially available for 100 developing countries or areas,
of which 37 violated the parameter constraint 0 < α < 1. Uganda provided
data which exhibited ε/θ = −14.0017, which is in different magnitude than in
other countries. Investment in Uganda has been exceptionally low, the ratio
of agricultural workers is almost 90%, and it has been subject to long-lasting
political violence. Hence, we exclude Uganda from the analysis.
The details of the estimates are
αA: estimated from all available years.
θ: estimated as an average from 1960 to 1970.
ε: estimated as an average from 1960 to 1970.
∆n: change from 1960 to 2007.
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